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Abstract
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an augmentation of public key encryp-
tion that allows users to encrypt and decrypt messages based on users’ at-
tributes. In a (t, s) threshold ABE, users who can decrypt a ciphertext must
hold at least t attributes among the s attributes specified by the encryptor.
At PKC 2010, Herranz, Laguillaumie and Ràfols proposed the first thresh-
old ABE with constant-size ciphertexts. In order to ensure the encryptor
can flexibly select the attribute set and a threshold value, they use dummy
attributes to satisfy the decryption requirement. The advantage of their
scheme is that any addition or removal of the attributes will not require any
change to users’ private keys or public parameters. Unfortunately, the need
for dummy attributes makes their scheme inefficient, since the computational
cost of encryption is linear to the size of selected attribute set and dummy
attribute set. In this work, we improve Herranz et al.’s work, and propose
a new threshold ABE scheme which does not use any dummy attribute. Our
scheme not only retains the nice feature of Herranz et al.’s scheme, but also
offers two improvements in comparison to the previous work. Firstly, the
computational costs of encryption and decryption are only linear in the size
of the selected attribute set. Secondly, without any dummy attribute, most
of the computations can be conducted without the knowledge of the thresh-
old t. Hence, threshold change in the encryption phase does not require
complete recomputation of the ciphertext.
Keywords: threshold attribute-based encryption, constant size, dummy
attributes, provable security
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1. Introduction
As an extension of public key encryption, Attribute-based encryption
(ABE) [24, 15, 3] has been an active area of research recently, since it supports
fine-grained access control of the encrypted data. ABE allows users to en-
crypt and decrypt messages based on user attributes. It is useful in providing
anonymous access control, which is a desirable property in many applications,
such as encrypted storage in distributed environments. In ciphertext-policy
ABE (CP-ABE), a user’s private key is generated by the central authority
according to his/her attributes. When someone encrypts a message, it selects
a policy indicating what attributes the decryptor should hold. Unfortunately,
this fascinating functionality comes at a cost. In a typical implementation,
the size of a ciphertext is usually proportional to the number of attributes
associated with it and the decryption time is proportional to the number of
attributes used during decryption.
The first CP-ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts under AND-gate
access structure was proposed in [7]. Subsequently, Herranz, Laguillaumie
and Ràfols [16]1 presented the first threshold ABE scheme with constant-size
ciphertexts, which supports a more expressive access structure compared to
[7]. Their construction works for the (t, s) threshold case, in which a user
who is authorized to decrypt should hold at least t attributes among the
s attributes selected by the encryptor. Due to the ability of the encryp-
tor to select any threshold value t and attribute set during the encryption
phase, their scheme is practical. Their scheme is inspired by the technique
introduced by Delerablée and Pointcheval [9] in achieiving dynamic thresh-
old identity-based encryption. Herranz et al.’s scheme is proven secure in the
standard model based on the hardness of the augmented multi-sequence of
exponents decisional Diffie-Hellman (aMSE-DDH) problem [16].
1.1. Motivation
The technique used by Delerablée and Pointcheval [9] is to incorporate
some “dummy information” (or, dummy users in their identity-based encryp-
tion scheme [9]) as part of the computation in order to satisfy the decryption
requirement. This technique was then used to construct threshold ABE in
[16]. However, the incorporation of dummy attributes in [16] brings efficiency
loss in both encryption and decryption, linear in the size of selected attribute
1The expanded version of this paper appeared in [1].
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set and dummy attribute set. To illustrate the efficiency lost, consider the
following parameters used in [16]. Let s be the number of attributes in the
chosen attribute set S, t be the threshold and m be the upper bound of the
number of attributes in S. The costs for encryption and decryption in [16]
are mainly dominated by m+ t+ 1 exponentiations and O(t2 +m) exponen-
tiations, respectively. It means, with the choice of small parameters in s and
t, we will still require a large computation effort, since m is typically large.
One of the possible application scenarios is the case which usually ap-
pears in a Massively Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG). As shown in [25],
the recent global epic combat strategy mobile game Clash-of-Clansr2 is an
example of such games which will require an access control mechanism as de-
scribed in this paper. In this game, each player has multiple attributes which
will elevate after gaining more experience in the gameplay. The attributes
are the possible features in the game, such as {“dragon”, “canon”, “bomb”,
· · · }. There is a large set of possible features that a player can acquire during
the game, as the set of the possible features is very large. If a player acquires
a new feature in the game, it means that this feature has been authorized by
the central server, otherwise people can just simply cheat by creating the new
feature themselves. Occasionally, the central server would like to broadcast
a special feature (such as an advanced weapon in this game), which will only
be available to people who have gained a particular level, which is measured
by the number of features that this player has acquired. This “offer” will be
broadcast to all players, but only players that satisfy the requirement can
read this broadcast message. Therefore, this message needs to be sent in an
encrypted form. Only players who have satisfied some certain level can de-
crypt this broadcast message. This certain level is determined by a minimum
number of attributes that this player has, and hence, the notion of threshold
requirement of attributes, t. Referring to the notation that was introduced
earlier, the number of possible attributes, S, is typically very large, but a
player only has a subset of this set, which is referred to as s. As an example,
the set S = {“dragon”, “snake”, “canon”, “bomb”, “air trap”, · · · }, where
typically the total maximum available in S (which is m in the above nota-
tion) are around 10,000 features in a single game. A user who has played for
a reasonable amount of time will gain approximately 100 features, and hence
s = 100. If the threshold t is set to something like 30, then a user who holds
2http://www.supercell.net/games/view/clash-of-clans
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at least 30 out of the possible features will be able to decrypt the broadcast
ciphertext. Nevertheless, if the scheme in [16] is used, then each eligible user
will still have to conduct a large computation, since m is large. This will
make the scheme impractical, especially in the case where the application
will be run in a mobile device. We note that in other scenarios, it would be
typical to have a large m as well, even the value of s is small.
Although Herranz et al.’s scheme [16] is not very computationally efficient,
their construction enjoys a nice feature. Namely, any addition or removal of
the attributes will not require any change to users’ private keys or public
parameters. We note that there are some subsequent works that achieve
threshold ABE but do not have this feature. These works will be reviewed
in the related work.
1.2. Summary of Our Contributions
The contributions of this paper are twofold:
 We improve Herranz et al.’s work and propose a threshold ABE scheme
which achieves constant-size ciphertexts without using dummy attributes.
Let s be the number of attributes in the chosen attribute set S, t be
the corresponding threshold and m be the upper bound of the number
of attributes in S. Compared to our scheme, the major computational
cost of encryption of Herranz et al.’s scheme includes m + t + 1 ex-
ponentiations whereas ours requires only s + 3 exponentiations, and
the major computational cost of decryption of Herranz et al.’s scheme
includes O(t2 +m) exponentiations, but ours only needs O(ts + s) ex-
ponentiations.
 Another fascinating feature of our scheme is that it supports an effi-
cient threshold change during the encryption process. The impact of
using dummy attributes is that the threshold t must be known in the
beginning of the encryption process, as this value determines how the
ciphertext is being formed. While in our scheme, the value of t only
affects one or two operations during the encryption, but not the overall
computation, and therefore, the encryptor can change the threshold t
without having to recompute the overall ciphertext.
1.3. Technical Contributions
In the following we describe an overview of our technique. Following [16],
let A be the set of attributes held by a user, and S be the set of attributes
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specified by the encryptor. Let AS = A ∩ S and F (γ) be the polynomial
defined as
F (γ) =
∏
at∈S(γ + τ(at))
∏
d∈Dm+t−1−s(γ + d)∏
at∈AS(γ + τ(at))
,
which has degree m+t−1−|AS|. Here, |AS| denotes the number of attributes
in AS and Dm+t−1−s denotes a dummy attribute set with m+t−1−s dummy
attributes.
Given the ciphertext, any user (whose AS 6= ∅) can compute
e(gα, h)−κe(gα, h)rκ, ∀i ∈ [1,m− 1], e(gα, h)rκγi and e(gα, h)rκF (γ).
According to the setting, all redundant group elements e(gα, h)rκγ
i
must be
removed in order to extract the encryption key e(gα, h)−κ from e(gα, h)rκF (γ).
Therefore, the user will successfully decrypt the ciphertext if and only if F (γ)
is of degree m− 1 at most, which requires |AS| ≥ t. If dummy attributes are
not embedded in F (γ), the degree of F (γ) will be always less than m − 1,
such that the user can decrypt the ciphertext even its attribute number does
not satisfy the threshold requirement.
We notice that the required degree of F (γ) in the construction is mainly
dominated by group elements e(gα, h)rκγ
i
, which can be computed by all
users. Since all users can compute e(gα, h)rκγ
i
for all i up to m − 1, the
security requires that e(gα, h)rκF (γ) with an (m − 1)-degree polynomial can
only be generated by valid users.
In our scheme we take a different approach. We avoid to use dummy
attributes by setting the way that all users can only compute e(gα, h)rκγ
i
for
all i up to s− t− 1, instead of m− 1. Let AS ⊆ A ∩ S be the attribute set
with t attributes at most and F (γ) be the polynomial defined as
F (γ) =
∏
at∈S(γ + τ(at))∏
at∈AS(γ + τ(at))
,
where F (γ) is a polynomial in γ with degree s− |As|.
Given the ciphertext, any private key user (A ∩ S 6= ∅) can compute
e(gβ, hαγ
s−t
)−κe(gα, h)rκγ
s−t
,∀i ∈ [1−m,−1], e(gα, h)rκγs−t+iand e(gα, h)rκF (γ).
The user will successfully decrypt the ciphertext if and only if F (γ) has
degree s− t. That is, |AS| = t. If |AS| < t, we have that the degree of F (γ)
is larger than s− t such that all redundancy (that is e(gα, h)rκγi) cannot be
removed for extracting the encryption key e(gβ, hαγ
s−t
)−κ from e(gα, h)rκF (γ).
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Structures of Private Key and Ciphertext
Private Key in [16] skA =
{{
g
r
γ+τ(at)
}
at∈A
,
{
hrγ
i
}
i∈[0,m−2]
, h
r−1
γ
}
Ciphertext in [16]
(
gκ·αγ , h
κ·α
∏
at∈S(γ+τ(at))
∏
d∈Dm+t−1−s
(γ+d)
, e(gα, h)κ ·M
)
Our Private Key skA =
{{
g
r
γ+τ(at)
}
at∈A
,
{
hrγ
i
}
i∈[1,m−1]
, h(r−β)γ
m
}
Our Ciphertext
(
gκ·αγ
s−t−m
, hκ·α
∏
at∈S(γ+τ(at)), e(gβ , hαγ
s−t
)κ ·M
)
Table 1: Comparison between Herranz et al.’s scheme [16] and our scheme in terms of the
structures of private key and ciphertext. In a private key, A is the set of attributes for a
user and r is the chosen random number in private key generation. In the encryption, S
is the set of attributes with s attributes where t is the corresponding threshold. κ is the
random number chosen during encryption.
1.4. Related Work
The notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first put forth by
Sahai and Waters in [24], which was originally referred to as fuzzy identity-
based encryption. Goyal et al. [15] further defined two variants of ABE,
namely Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE).
In a KP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes.
The decryption key, which is issued by an authority, is associated with an
access structure. The ciphertext will be decrypted if and only if the at-
tribute set of ciphertext satisfies the access structure of the decryption key.
In contrast, in a CP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is equipped with an access
structure, while the decryption key is associated with a set of attributes.
The decryption is successful if and only if the attribute set fulfills the access
structure. CP-ABE is more appropriate in access control applications, since
it enables the encryptor to select the access structure to decide who is autho-
rized to acquire the message. While the notion of CP-ABE has been proposed
by Goyal et al. [15], it was first studied in [7, 3]. The work of Cheung and
Newport [7] only supports AND gates. The first concrete construction with
expressiveness was presented by Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [3] by using
threshold secret sharing to enforce the policy in the encryption phase. Its se-
curity was analyzed in the generic group model. Goyal et al. [14] proposed a
generic construction to transform a KP-ABE scheme into a CP-ABE scheme,
with the drawback of large ciphertext size (roughly O(s3.4)) which makes it
impractical for expressive policies. Subsequently, a number of papers have
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continued this line to achieve higher security schemes with expressive policy
[18, 27, 21].
The ciphertext size in most constructions of CP-ABE, for example, [8,
26, 22, 7, 3, 17], is (at least) linear in the number of selected attributes. The
first CP-ABE with constant-size ciphertexts under (n, n)-threshold access
structure was proposed in [11]. While the KP-ABE scheme with constant-
size ciphertexts was achieved by Attrapadung, Libert and Panafieu in [2]
which supports general access structures. Herranz, Laguillaumie and Ràfols
[16] initiated the study on achieving constant size ciphertext in threshold
ABE, which is more expressive than merely AND gates (c.f. [7]). They
incorporated the technique from [9] to achieve the goal, where the original
work [9] concentrates on achieving constant-size ciphertext in a dynamic
threshold identity-based encryption setting. The security in [16] is provable
secure against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) in the generic group model.
Later, Yamada et al. [28] showed a generic construction for achieving chosen-
ciphertext security (CCA) under the condition that the ABE scheme is of
either delegatability or verifiability. Aiming to achieve CCA security in the
standard model, Ge et al. [13] presented another threshold CP-ABE scheme
with constant size ciphertexts by using the technique of [6]. Chen et al. [5]
and Doshi and Jinwala [10] presented other constructions of threshold ABE
with constant-size ciphertexts and full security.
In [13, 5], the private key generation requires a fixed universal attribute
set prior to the private key generation. This means, any addition or removal
of the attributes will require changes to all of the user’s private keys. In
contrast, Herranz et al.’s scheme [16] does not have this drawback. It is
because there is no requirement to map an attribute to a group element
in this scheme (cf. [13, 5]). The difference between these two approaches
are usually referred to as “small universe” vs. “large universe”. In a small
universe constructions, at the setup time, a polynomial sized universe of
attributes must be fixed. Additionally, the public parameters size is linear to
the size of the attribute universe set. On the other hand, in a large universe
constructions, the size of the attribute universe can be exponentially large.
Furthermore, the size of the public parameters is linear to the upper bound
of attribute number in the selected attribute set in the encryption phase.
For further details about the differences between small universe and large
universe, we refer the readers to [19, 28]. The notion of ABE was originally
proposed for flexible access control. We refer the readers to such as [23, 20, 12]
for some recent interesting work on access control.
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2. Preliminaries
In this section, we revisit the definition and security model of threshold
attribute-based encryption given in [16]. We also introduce a variant compu-
tational hard problem which is related to the security proof of our scheme.
2.1. Threshold Attribute-Based Encryption
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption supporting threshold de-
cryption policy consists of the following four algorithms.
 Setup(λ,P ,m) The algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ, a
universal set of attributes P and the upper bound of attribute number
in encryption. It returns public parameters params and a master secret
key.
 Key Extraction(params, A,msk) The algorithm takes as input public
parameters, an attribute set A ⊆ P and the master secret key. It
returns a private key skA for this attribute set.
 Encryption(params, S, t,M) The algorithm takes as input public pa-
rameters, an attribute set S, a threshold t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ |S| and a
message M . It returns a ciphertext CT for (S, t).
 Decryption(CT, (S, t), A, skA) The algorithm takes as input a cipher-
text for (S, t), an attribute set A and the corresponding private key
skA. It returns a message if |A ∩ S| ≥ t, and ⊥ otherwise.
We notice that the size of P in the original definition [16] is equal to m.
However, we find that the size of P can be larger than m. The independence
is much practical in use and we therefore adopt the latter definition. We show
that the difference will not affect the construction and the security proof in
this work.
The security of threshold ABE we consider here is indistinguishability
under selective security against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-sCPA), which
is defined by the following game between an attacker A and a challenger.
1. The challenger specifies a universe of attributes P and upper bound
number m, and gives them to the attacker A.
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2. The attackerA selects a subset S ⊆ P with s attributes and a threshold
t for challenge, where s and t satisfy 1 ≤ t ≤ s.
3. The challenger runs the setup algorithm of ABE algorithm and gives
params to the attacker.
4. Private Key Queries: The attacker adaptively sends any subset of
attributes A ⊆ P for private key queries with the restriction |A ∩
S| < t. The challenger runs the key extraction algorithm and gives the
corresponding private key skA to the attacker A.
5. Challenge: The attacker outputs two messages M0,M1 for challenge.
The challenger randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and runs the encryp-
tion algorithm on the message Mb for (S, t) specified in the second step.
The corresponding ciphertext CT ∗ is then given to the attacker as the
challenge ciphertext.
6. The attacker continues to issue private key queries as in Step 4.
7. The adversary outputs a guess b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
The advantage of the attacker in the above game is defined as |Pr[b′ =
b]− 1
2
|. A Threshold ABE is said to be IND-sCPA secure if for all probabilistic
polynomial-time attackers A its advantage in the game is negligible in λ.
2.2. The aMSE-DDH Problem
Our scheme is based on bilinear pairing. Its security relies on a hard
problem slightly different from the problem defined in [16, 9]. Here, we
still call this problem as augmented multi-sequence of exponents decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem (aMSE-DHE) since the main difference is in the given
exponents. We prove that this aMSE-DDH problem is one of the generic
Diffie-Hellman problems defined by Boneh, Boyen and Goh in [4].
Let BG = (G,GT , p, e) be a bilinear pairing group, where p is the prime or-
der of both G and GT , and e is the bilinear map. Let g0, h0 be two generators
of G. The input of aMSE-DDH problem consists of q, s, t, f(x), g(x), T ∈ GT
where f(x), g(x) are random co-prime polynomials in the following formulas
f(x) =
q∏
i=1
(x+ xi), g(x) =
s∏
i=1
(x+ x′i),
9
and group elements
g0, h0
gα00 , g
α0γ
0 , g
α0γ2
0 , · · · , g
α0γq+m
0 , g
κα0f(γ)γs−t
0
gβ00 , g
β0γ
0 , g
β0γ2
0 , · · · , g
β0γq+t
0
gω0 , g
ωγ
0 , g
ωγ2
0 , · · · , g
ωγq+t
0
hα00 , h
α0γ
0 , h
α0γ2
0 , · · · , h
α0γ2m
0 , h
κα0g(γ)γm
0
hβ00 , h
β0γ
0 , h
β0γ2
0 , · · · , h
β0γm−1+(t−1)
0
hω0 , h
ωγ
0 , h
ωγ2
0 , · · · , h
ωγm+t
0 .
All roots xi, x
′
i are given but all exponents α0, β0, γ, ω are unknown. The aim
of this problem is to decide whether the given group element T is
T = e(g0, h0)
κα0β0f(γ)γm+s−1 ,
or T is a random element from GT .
Theorem 1. The aMSE-DDH assumption is a (P,Q, F )-Generic Diffie-Hellman
Exponent (GDHE) assumption.
Proof. Given q, s, t, f(x), g(x), T ∈ GT where f(x), g(x) are co-prime poly-
nomials in the following formulas
f(x) =
q∏
i=1
(x+ xi),
g(x) =
s∏
i=1
(x+ x′i),
and group elements
g0, h0
gα00 , g
α0γ
0 , g
α0γ2
0 , · · · , g
α0γq+m
0 , g
κα0f(γ)γs−t
0
gβ00 , g
β0γ
0 , g
β0γ2
0 , · · · , g
β0γq+t
0
gω0 , g
ωγ
0 , g
ωγ2
0 , · · · , g
ωγq+t
0
hα00 , h
α0γ
0 , h
α0γ2
0 , · · · , h
α0γ2m
0 , h
κα0g(γ)γm
0
hβ00 , h
β0γ
0 , h
β0γ2
0 , · · · , h
β0γm−1+(t−1)
0
hω0 , h
ωγ
0 , h
ωγ2
0 , · · · , h
ωγm+t
0 ,
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the aim of this problem is to decide whether
T = e(g0, h0)
κα0β0f(γ)γm+s−1
or T is a random element from GT .
In the following theorem, we prove that this hard problem captures the
independence as required in the (P,Q, F )-GDHE problem.
Theorem 2. The aMSE-DDH assumption is a (P,Q, F )-GDHE assump-
tion.
Proof. Let h0 = g
η
0 for some integer η. The aMSE-DDH problem can be
reformulated as a (P,Q, F )-GDHE structure where
P =

1 η κα0f(γ)γ
s−t ηκα0g(γ)γ
m
α0 α0γ α0γ
2 · · · α0γq+m
β0 β0γ β0γ
2 · · · β0γq+t
ω ωγ ωγ2 · · · ωγq+t
ηα0 ηα0γ ηα0γ
2 · · · ηα0γ2m
ηβ0 ηβ0γ ηβ0γ
2 · · · ηβ0γm+t−2
ηω ηωγ ηωγ2 · · · ηωγm+t

,
Q = 1,
F = ηκα0β0f(γ)γ
m+s−1.
To prove aMSE-DDH problem is a (P,Q, F )-GDHE problem, we need to
prove that no coefficients {ai,j} and b1 exist such that
F =
|P |∑
i,j=1
ai,jpipj + b1q1,
where pi, pj are from P and q1 is from Q. By making all possible products of
two polynomials from P that contains common parameter ηκα0β0, we prove
that there is no linear combination from the set R below which can generate
F .
R =
(
ηκα0β0 · g(γ)γm ηκα0β0 · g(γ)γm+1 · · · ηκα0β0 · g(γ)γq+m+t
ηκα0β0 · f(γ)γs−t ηκα0β0 · f(γ)γs−t+1 · · · ηκα0β0 · f(γ)γm+s−2
)
.
11
If there exists such a combination, it can be written as
ηκα0β0f(γ)γ
m+s−1 = ηκα0β0g(γ)γ
m · A(γ) + ηκα0β0f(γ)γs−t ·B(γ),
where A(γ) is a polynomial in γ of degree at most (q + t) and B(γ) is a
polynomial of degree at most (m + t − 2). Let the degree of A(x) be dA in
the above formula. We firstly simplify the formula as
f(γ)γm+s−1 = g(γ)γm · A(γ) + f(γ)γs−t ·B(γ).
Then, we have that
f(γ)
(
γm+t−1 −B(γ)
)
= g(γ)γm+t−sA(γ).
The degree of B(γ) is at most m + s − 2 so that the left polynomial
cannot be equivalent to zero. Therefore, the above equation implies that the
two non-zero polynomials must have the same degree. The degree of the
left polynomial is q + m + t − 1 while the degree of the right polynomial is
s+m+ t− s+ dA. Hence, we have that dA = q − 1.
Since f(γ) and g(γ)γm+t−s are co-prime, we therefore have f(γ)|A(γ)
or A(γ) ≡ 0. The degree dA = q − 1 implies that A(γ) ≡ 0 and then
f(γ)
(
γm+t−1 − B(γ)
)
≡ 0, which is contrary to non-zero f(γ)
(
γm+t−1 −
B(γ)
)
. This indicates no A(α), B(α) exist and then no {ai,j, b1} exist. This
yields the theorem. 
3. Our New Threshold ABE Scheme
In this part we describe our threshold ABE scheme in details, which does
not use any dummy attributes during encryption and decryption.
3.1. Description of Scheme
Setup(λ,P ,m). The master entity chooses a suitable encoding τ 3 which
maps each of the attributes at ∈ P to a different element τ(at) ∈ Zp. It also
3We adopt the encoding τ used in the original paper [16] for scheme construction and
security proof.
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chooses a bilinear group BG = (G,GT , p, e) and generators g, h of G1. Next,
the master entity picks at random α, β, γ ∈ Zp and sets
gi = g
α
γi , hi = h
αγi , u = gβ, i ∈ [0,m].
The master secret key is msk = (g, h, β, γ) and the public parameters for P
are
params =
{
BG, m, g0, g1, g2, · · · , gm, h0, h1, h2, · · · , hm, u, τ
}
.
Key Extraction(params, A,msk). Given any subset A ⊆ P , the master
entity picks r ∈ Zp at random and computes skA as
skA =
{{
g
r
γ+τ(at)
}
at∈A
, hrγ
1
, hrγ
2
, · · · , hrγm−1 , h(r−β)γm
}
.
Encryption(params, S, t,M). Given a subset S ⊆ P with s = |S| attributes,
a threshold t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ s, and a message M ∈ GT , the sender picks
at random κ ∈ Zp and computes
C1 =
(
gm−(s−t)
)κ
C2 = h
κ·α·
∏
at∈S(γ+τ(at))
K = e(hs−t, u)
κ.
The group element C2 could be computed from h
αγi given in the public
parameters params. Let fS(x) =
∏
at∈S(x + τ(at)) be the polynomial in x
and ai be the coefficient of x
i. We have C2 =
∏s
i=0(h
αγi)aiκ. The ciphertext
is (C1, C2, C3), where C3 = K ·M .
Decryption((C1, C2, C3), (S, t), A, skA). Any user with a set of attributes A
satisfying |A ∩ S| ≥ t can decrypt the ciphertext by using the private key
skA. The decryption works as follows. Let AS be any subset of A ∩ S with
|AS| = t, and fS\AS(x) =
∏
at∈S\AS(x+ τ(at)) be the polynomial in x and bi
be the coefficient of xi.
The user first computes the aggregation value as
Aggregate4
({
g
r
γ+τ(at) , τ(at)
}
at∈AS
)
= g
r∏
at∈AS (γ+τ(at)) .
4The detail aggregation algroithm can be found in [9], which requires O(t2) exponen-
tiations.
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Then, it computes
L = e
(
g
r∏
at∈AS (γ+τ(at)) , C2
)
K−1 · L = e
(
C1, h
(r−β)γm ·
s−t−1∏
i=0
(
hrγ
i+m−(s−t)
)bi)
Finally, the user recovers the message by computing M = C3 ·K−1L/L.
3.2. Correctness
The decryption is correct since we have
L = e
(
g
r∏
at∈AS (γ+τ(at)) , C2
)
= e
(
g
r∏
at∈AS (γ+τ(at)) , hκ·α·
∏
at∈S(γ+τ(at))
)
= e(g, h)rκα
∏
at∈(S−AS)
(
γ+τ(at)
)
,
K−1L = e
(
C1, h
(r−β)γm ·
s−t−1∏
i=0
(
hrγ
i+m−(s−t)
)bi)
= e
(
g
κα
γm−(s−t) , h(r−β)γ
m ·
s−t−1∏
i=0
(
hrγ
i+m−(s−t)
)bi)
= e
(
gκα, h(r−β)γ
s−t ·
s−t−1∏
i=0
(
hrγ
i
)bi)
= e
(
gκα, h−βγ
s−t ·
s−t∏
i=0
(
hrγ
i
)bi)
= e(g, h)−καβγ
s−t ·
s−t∏
i=0
e(g, h)καr·biγ
i
= e(g, h)−καβγ
s−t · e(g, h)rκα
∏
at∈(S−AS)
(
γ+τ(at)
)
.
3.3. Security Proof
Theorem 3. For any adversary A against the IND-sCPA security of our
ABE scheme with advantage ε for a universe P of q attributes, and a chal-
lenge pair (S, t) with s = |S|, there exists an algorithm for solving the
(q,m, s, t)-aMSE-DDH problem with at least the same advantage ε.
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Proof. Let A be an adversary against the IND-sCPA security of our ABE
scheme. We construct an algorithm (simulator) B that uses A as a sub-
routine to solve the aMSD-DDH problem. In particular, the simulator B is
given an instance of this hard problem and its aim is to solve this problem by
using A’s guess of the encrypted message. The interaction between A and B
works as follows.
Initialize: The simulator B specifies a universe of attributes P = {at1, · · · , atq}.
Next, the adversary selectively chooses (S, t) to attack, where S is a set with
s attributes and t is a threshold t satisfying 1 ≤ t ≤ s. Without loss of
generality, let S = {at1, at2, · · · , ats} be the challenge set.
Setup: Let group elements in the instance that B receives be
gα00 , g
α0γ
0 , g
α0γ2
0 , · · · , g
α0γq+m
0 , g
κα0f(γ)γs−t
0 , (1)
gβ00 , g
β0γ
0 , g
β0γ2
0 , · · · , g
β0γq+t
0 , (2)
gω0 , g
ωγ
0 , g
ωγ2
0 , · · · , g
ωγq+t
0 , (3)
hα00 , h
α0γ
0 , h
α0γ2
0 , · · · , h
α0γ2m
0 , h
κα0g(γ)γm
0 , (4)
hβ00 , h
β0γ
0 , h
β0γ2
0 , · · · , h
β0γm−1+(t−1)
0 , (5)
hω0 , h
ωγ
0 , h
ωγ2
0 , · · · , h
ωγm+t
0 , (6)
where f(x), g(x) are co-prime polynomials with degrees q and s, respectively,
defined as
f(x) =
q∏
i=1
(x+ xi), g(x) =
s∏
i=1
(x+ x∗i ).
The simulator B defines the encoding of each attribute into a unique root
as below:
τ(at) =
{
x is a root of f(x) if at /∈ S,
x is a root of g(x) if at ∈ S.
Then it sets g, h, α, β, γ using the group elements and unknown exponents in
the instance as
g = g
f(γ)
0 , h = h0, α = α0γ
m, β = β0γ
t−1, γ = γ.
Then we have
gi = g
α
γi = g
f(γ)α0γ
m
γi
0 = g
α0γm−if(γ)
0 : i ∈ [0,m],
hi = h
α0γmγi
0 = h
α0γm+i
0 : i ∈ [0,m],
u = gβ = g
β0f(γ)γt−1
0 .
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The degree of polynomial γm−if(γ) in γ is at most q+m. And we have that
all gi can be computed from the line (1) of the instance, all hi are available
from the line (4) of the instance, and u can be computed from the line (2) of
the instance because f(γ)γt−1 in u has degree q + t− 1 only.
The algorithm B then simulates the rest of the game as below.
KeyGen: For a key extraction query on the attribute set A ⊆ P , let AS =
A∩S where S is the challenge attribute set. We should have that |AS| ≤ t−1.
The corresponding private key for this attribute set is
skA =
{{
g
r
γ+τ(at)
}
at∈A
, hrγ
1
, hrγ
2
, · · · , hrγm−1 , h(r−β)γm
}
,
which requires the simulator to compute without knowing α and β.
The simulator first randomly chooses r′ ∈ Zp and sets the random number
r in the above private key as
r = (r′ωγ + β0)γ
t−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS
(γ + τ(at)),
where β0, γ, ω are from the instance. We have that r is uniformly random
due to r′.
Since each attribute at in A is either in the set A\AS or AS, we have
x+ τ(ati)
∣∣∣f(x) ∏
at∈AS
(x+ τ(at)).
Let fati(x) be
fati(x) =
xt−1−|AS |f(x)
∏
at∈AS(x+ τ(at))
x+ τ(ati)
,
which therefore is a polynomial in x of degree at most q + t− 1. Define the
following polynomials f i1(x) and f2(x):
f i1(x) = x
i+t−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS
(x+ τ(at)), ∀i ∈ [1,m− 1],
f2(x) = x
m+t−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS
(x+ τ(at))− xm+t−1.
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Their degrees are both at most m+ t− 2. Then we have
g
r
γ+τ(at) = g
(r′ωγ+β0)γ
t−1−|AS |∏at∈AS (γ+τ(at))·f(γ)
γ+τ(at)
0
= g
r′ωγfati (γ)+β0fati (γ)
0 ,
hrγ
i
= h
(r′ωγ+β0)γt−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS
(γ+τ(at))·γi
0
= h
(r′ωγ+β0)γi+t−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS
(γ+τ(at))
0
= h
r′ωγf i1(γ)+β0f
i
1(γ)
0 ,
h(r−β)γ
m
= h
(
(r′ωγ+β0)γt−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS
(γ+τ(at))−β
)
γm
0
= h
(r′ωγ+β0)γm+t−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS
(γ+τ(at))−βγm
0
= h
(r′ωγ+β0)γm+t−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS
(γ+τ(at))−β0γm+t−1
0
= h
r′ωγfm1 (γ)+β0f2(γ)
0 ,
and
 ωγfati(γ) is a polynomial in γ with q + t degree at most;
 β0fati(γ) is a polynomial in γ with q + t− 1 degree at most;
 ωγf i1(γ) is a polynomial in γ with m+ t− 1 degree at most;
 β0f
i
1(γ) is a polynomial in γ with m+ t− 2 degree at most;
 ωγfm1 (γ) is a polynomial in γ with m+ t− 1 degree at most;
 β0f2(γ) is a polynomial in γ with m+ t− 2 degree at most.
Finally, the simulator B computes g
r
γ+τ(ati) for all ati from the lines (2)
and (3) of the instance, hrγ
i
for all i ∈ [1,m− 1] and h(r−β)γm from the lines
(5) and (6) of the instance.
Challenge: Once the adversary A sends two messages M0,M1 ∈ GT for
challenge, the simulator B flips a random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and sets the chal-
lenge ciphertext on message Mb for (S, t) as
C∗1 = g
κα0f(γ)γs−t
0 ,
C∗2 = h
κα0α0g(γ)γm
0 ,
C∗3 = T ·Mb,
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where g
κα0f(γ)γs−t
0 is from the last element of the line (1), h
κα0α0g(γ)γm
0 is from
the last element of the line (2) and T is the unknown element to be decided.
Let κ in the instance be the random number for encryption. If T =
e(g0, h0)
α0β0f(γ)γm+s−1 , we have
C∗1 =
(
gm−(s−t)
)κ
= gκαγ
s−t−m
= g
κα0f(γ)γs−t
0 ,
C∗2 = h
κ·α·
∏
at∈S(γ+τ(at)) = h
κα0g(γ)γm
0 ,
C∗3 = e(hs−t, u)
κ ·Mb = e(hα0γ
m+s−t
0 , g
f(γ)β0γt−1
0 ) ·Mb = T ·Mb.
Therefore, CT ∗ is a valid challenge ciphertext for (S, t) on the message Mb.
On the other hand, if T is random, C3 is random and independent of the
choice of the bit b.
Guess: The adversary returns a guess b′ of b, and the simulator returns true
if b′ = b which means T = e(g0, h0)
α0β0f(γ)γm+s−1 . Otherwise, the simulator
returns a random T .
There is no abortion during the simulation as all private keys and the
challenge ciphertext are computable from the instance of the hard problem.
It is easy to see that g, h are random group elements because of g0, h0 and
α, β, γ are uniformly random and independent due to α0, β0, γ in the instance.
Notice that each random number r in the private key generation is computed
by (r′ωγ + β0)γ
t−1−|AS |
∏
at∈AS(γ + τ(at)) where r
′ is chosen randomly and
independently. Therefore, the simulation is indistinguishable from the real
scheme when T is true. The adversary cannot distinguish the simulation
from the real scheme and will break the scheme with advantage ε according
to the definition of security. When T is false, it is uniformly random and
independent from the view of C∗1 , C
∗
2 so that it is a one-time pad and hence
the adversary has no advantage in guessing the chosen bit b. Therefore we
have that
εreduction =
∣∣Pr[B guess T=True|T=True]− Pr[B guess T=True|T=False]∣∣
=
∣∣Pr[b′ = b|T=True]− Pr[b′ = b|T=False]∣∣
=
1
2
+ ε− 1
2
= ε.
This completes the proof for theorem. 
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4. Discussion and Comparison
4.1. Benefits of Encryption without Dummy Attributes
Let f(γ) be the polynomial in γ whose degree is m − 1. We have the
computation on hκαf(γ) from κ, hαγ
i
: i ∈ [0,m− 1] requires m exponentia-
tions. In particular, let fi be the coefficient of γ
i in f(γ). We have hκαf(γ) is
computed by
hκαf(γ) =
m∏
i=0
(hαγ
i
)fi .
If we want to compute hκαf(γ)(γ+d), we cannot save the overload computation
with the additional input hκαf(γ) as hκαf(γ)(γ+d) must be computed by
hκαf(γ)(γ+d) =
m∏
i=0
(hαγ
i+1
)fi ·
(
hκαf(γ)
)d
,
which still requires a linear number of exponentiations in the degree of
f(γ)(γ + d).
The main computation in encryption of [16] is dominated by
C2 = h
κ·α
∏
at∈S(γ+τ(at))
∏
d∈Dm+t−1−s
(γ+d)
,
while in our scheme it is dominated by C2 = h
κ·α
∏
at∈S(γ+τ(at)). Based on
the above analysis, our encryption time is liner in the number of s while the
scheme in [16] is linear in the number of m, where m is the upper bound of s.
The corresponding decryption is also different and ours will be much faster.
The detailed efficiency comparison is provided in Table 2.
4.2. Efficient Threshold Change
Another benefit of our encryption is the dynamic choice of the threshold
t after the selection of attribute set S. Notice that an encryption is to
compute C1, C2 and K, which costs one exponentiation, |S| exponentiations
and one exponentiation, respectively. In our scheme, upon receiving the set
S, the encryptor can compute C2 without the need of the threshold t, which
dominates most of exponentiations in encryption. Once the threshold t is
given, only two exponentiations are required to compute C1 and K. While
in [16], both S and t must be provided before the encryption, otherwise
the encryptor cannot perform the computation of C2. This property allows
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Schemes Key Size Ciphertext Size Encryption Cost Decryption Cost
CN[7] (2n+ 1)|G| (n+ 1)|G|+ |GT | (n+ 2)e (n+ 1)p
DJ[10] (|A|+ 2)|G| 2|G|+ |GT | 3e 2p
EMN+[11] 2|G| 2|G|+ |GT | 3e 2p + 3e
BSW[3] (2|A|+ 1)|G| (`+ 1)|G|+ |GT | (2`+ 2)e |I|p
W[27] (|A|+ 2)|G| (`+ 2)|G|+ |GT | (2`+ 2)e |I|p
GZC+[13] 2n(n+ |A|)|G| 2|G|+ |GT | 3e 2p + 2ne
HLR[16] (m+ |A|)|G| 2|G|+ |GT | (m+ t+ 1)e 3p +O(t2 +m)e
Ours (m+ |A|)|G| 2|G|+ |GT | 1p + (s+ 3)e 2p +O(t2 + s)e
Table 2: Efficiency Comparison of related CP-ABE schemes. p and e are paring computa-
tion and exponentiation computation, respectively. n is the number of universal attributes.
` is the size of an access formula. s is the number of attributes in the chosen attribute set
S. t is the corresponding threshold number and m is the upper bound of attribute number
in S. |A| and |I| are the numbers of attributes in a user’s key and the number of at-
tributes satisfied the function, respectively. We notice that the pairing computation in the
encryption can be saved if all e(hαγ
i
, u) have been precomputed in the public parameters.
the encryptor to flexibly change the threshold during the application before
publishing the ciphertext. More precisely, suppose the encryptor has already
created a ciphertext for (S, t) using the random number κ and the ciphertext
is not yet published. If the threshold t needs to be revised with t′ for any
t′, the encryptor can use the old C2 and re-compute C1, K for the updated
threshold t′, which allows the encryptor to quickly change (S, t) into (S, t′)
with two exponentiations. There is no security issue in this variant encryption
because only the ciphertext for (S, t′) is published and it is equivalent to a
ciphertext generation from the encryption algorithm directly. The detailed
performance comparison is provided in Table 3.
5. Conclusion
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has proven to be a very promising
cryptographic primitive that offers fine-grain access control. Herranz et al.
proposed the first constant-size threshold ABE. However, their scheme makes
use of dummy attributes, which leads to inefficiency. In this work, we im-
proved Herranz et al.’s work and proposed a new threshold ABE scheme
which does not require any dummy attributes. We made two specific improve-
ments in comparison to the previous work. First, the cost for encryption and
decryption is only linear to the size of the selected attribute set. Second,
the threshold can be decided after the selection of the attribute set in the
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Schemes Universe Threshold Change Security Expressiveness
CN[7] Small Ö Selective AND-gate
DJ[10] Small Ö Full AND-gate
EMN+[11] Small Ö Selective (n,n)-Threshold
BSW[3] Large Ö Selective Access Tree
W [27] Small Ö Selective LSSS
GZC+[13] Small ≈ 1e Selective Threshold
HLR[16] Large (m+ t− 1)e Selective Threshold
Ours Large 2e Selective Threshold
Table 3: Comparison of related CP-ABE schemes. The symbol “Ö” means that it does
not support the corresponding functionality.
encryption phase. These two properties make our scheme more attractive in
practical use.
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